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JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION TO ABOLISH 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES: 
R.LP. FOR THE R.A.P. 
Stewart E. Sterk* 
The Rule Against Perpetuities ("the Rule") may be on its last 
legs. Over the last decade, legislatures across the nation have been 
abolishing, or substantially curtailing, the common law rule that, 
despite its renowned complexity, has endured for more than 300 
years.^ Why the dramatic change in what had once been a sleepy 
enclave of property law? In part, the answer lies with the 
exemption from the generation-skipping transfer tax, which has 
prompted wealthy people and their advisors to press for the right 
to create dynasty trusts, forever insulated from estate taxation.^ In 
part, the Rule's complexity, combined with broader availability of 
malpractice relief against lawyers, has created pressure from 
within the bar.^ 
While these pressures might have been sufficient, by 
themselves, to generate abolition of the Rule within any single 
* Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
' The origin of the Rule Against Perpetuities is generally attributed to The Duke of 
Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682). 
^ See 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (2003); see also Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tail Is Killing the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, TAX NOTES, Apr. 24, 2000, at 569; A1 W. King, A Generation-
Skipping Trust: Unlimited Duration? Why Not?, TRUSTS & ESTATES, June 1999, at 8. 
Lucas V. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) is significant in this regard. In Lucas, the 
California Supreme Court held that an estate planning lawyer owed a duty of care to the 
estate's beneficiaries, even if no "privity" existed between the lawyer and the 
beneficiaries—expanding the possibility for malpractice liability by estate planning 
lawyers. At the same time, the Court held that the lawyer involved had not breached [his 
or her] duty of care by drafting an instrument that violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
because a lawyer might reasonably be unaware of the Rule's technicalities. Although the 
Lucas court did not impose malpractice liability in the case before it, the court's 
willingness to abandon the privity rule expanded the prospect of liability and created an 
incentive for lawyers to reduce the technicalities associated with the Rule. See generally 
Jesse Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found at Last, 65 LOWA L. 
REV. 151,152 (1979) (noting that expanded malpractice liability provides an incentive for 
lawyers to reform highly technical rules). 
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state, competition among the states has hastened the move toward 
abolition. Several state legislatures—stimulated by 
entrepreneurial lawyers—have sought to attract trust business by 
relaxing long-established constraints on trusts, including but not 
limited to the Rule Against Perpetuities." 
Is this competition among states a "race to the top," cleansing 
the legal system of an arcane rule that has outlived its usefulness?' 
The answer is uncertain. Because perpetuities reform in one state 
has effects outside the state, competition among states does not 
guarantee an efficient perpetuities regime. Closer examination 
reveals that abolition of the Rule is likely to generate 
inefficiencies. Those inefficiencies, however, will not appear for 
decades, a period so long and so fraught with other uncertainties 
that potential inefficiency provides a weak basis for opposing the 
Rule's abolition. 
I. ABOLISHING THE RULE: WHY DOES ANYONE CARE? 
John Chipman Gray offered the classic statement of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at 
See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in 
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1893 (2000); Douglas J. 
Blattmachr & Richard W. Hompesch II, Alaska v. Delaware, Heavyweight Competition in 
New Trust Laws, 12 PROB. & PROP. 32 (1998). 
' The "race to the top" metaphor originated as a response to William Gary's argument 
that interstate competition for corporate charters was a "race for the bottom" with 
Delaware leading the race to reduce protection for shareholders in order to attract 
corporate managers, who would make decisions about where to charter the corporation. 
William L. Gary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 705 (1974). 
A number of scholars responded to Gary by arguing that competition among 
jurisdictions ultimately increases shareholder value by reducing transaction costs. See, e.g., 
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN GORPORATE LAW 14-24 (1993). 
The debate about whether jurisdictional competition generates efficient legal rules 
has expanded well beyond corporate law. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection 
Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 GORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (trusts); 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to 
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. GAL. L. REV. 745 (1995) (family law); Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) 
(environmental law); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 GOLUM. L. REV. 473, 506-28 
(1991) (land use). See also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McGahery, The New 
Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best 
World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997) (examining basic premises of jurisdictional competition 
arguments). 
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all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest."® The Rule has often been described as a 
compromise permitting a property owner to control the disposition 
of her property for the lifetime of persons whose propensities she 
knows and fears, and for twenty-one years thereafter, but not 
beyond the period during which decedent might plausibly assert 
some special knowledge of the propensities of one of her 
beneficiaries.^ 
Within a limited academic community, the Rule has long 
stirred passions out of all proportion to its practical impact. Fifty 
years ago. Harvard's Barton Leach published two articles whose 
titles—Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror and Staying the Slaughter 
of the Innocents—reflect his conviction that the Rule was a legal 
nightmare in need of immediate reform.® In the 1970s, professors 
from Harvard and Columbia law schools waged battle at the 
American Law Institute over the appropriate shape of perpetuities 
reform.' And in the 1980s, Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner 
joined the issue in a series of high-profile articles—Dukeminier 
supporting "wait-and-see" as the appropriate vehicle for 
perpetuities reform,^" Waggoner arguing that a future interest 
should be upheld, even if it violated the common law Rule, so long 
as the interest actually vested within a period of ninety years from 
the date of the interest's creation." 
' JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
' See ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 188 (1880): 
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events 
which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see. 
Within the former province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity 
of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make 
for him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest 
judgment is constantly baffled by the course of events. I submit, then, that the 
proper limit of Perpetuity is that of lives in being at the time when the settlement 
takes effect. 
Id.\ see also JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS 822-23 (2003). 
* See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. 
REV. 1349 (1954). 
' Professor James Casner of Harvard, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of 
Property (Donative Transfers) championed the wait-and-see doctrine as the preferred 
course of perpetuities reform; Professors Richard Powell, Curtis Berger, and Louis Lusky 
of Columbia opposed wait-and-see. See Proceedings of 1978 ALT Annual Meeting, 55 
ALI Proc. 222-309 (1978); Proceedings of 1979 ALT Annual Meeting, 56 ALI Proc 424-91 
(1979). Casner won, and the Second Restatement reflected wait-and-see. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 1.1-1.6 (1983) (Donative Transfers). For 
further discussion of the debate, see Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023,1065-66 (1987). 
Dukeminier, supra note 9; Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985). 
" Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The 
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Although many states did enact one reform measure or 
another, pressure for outright abolition of the Rule did not arise 
until after 1986, when Congress enacted the generation-skipping 
transfer tax.^^ The federal estate tax is designed to be a once-a-
generation tax on wealth, but until 1986, wealthy property owners 
could skip a generation (or sometimes two generations) of tax by 
making transfers—generally in trust—to grandchildren or even 
more remote descendants." The generation-skipping transfer tax 
closed that loophole by subjecting these transfers to a separate tax. 
At the same time, however. Congress included an exemption of 
$1,000,000 per transferor.'" Because Congress had reduced the 
opportunity to avoid estate taxation, and simultaneously created 
an exemption from the new tax, pressure inevitably arose to make 
the exemption as valuable as possible. A transferor could derive 
maximum value from the exemption by creating a trust that would 
last as long as possible, and preferably forever, so that the trust 
property would never be subject to estate taxation in any other 
person's estate." The principal doctrinal obstacle to perpetual 
trusts—sometimes called "dynasty trusts"—was the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.'^ 
As Congress was enacting the generation-skipping transfer 
tax, state courts were expanding the scope of malpractice liability 
to will beneficiaries whose inheritance had been lost as a result of 
lawyer incompetence. Historically, will beneficiaries could not 
recover on malpractice claims because they were not in "privity" 
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988). 
12 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2002). 
'2 For illustration, suppose decedent's will had left her entire estate to a trustee, with 
income payable to her child for life, and directions to distribute the principal, at the child's 
death, to decedent's grandchildren. Estate tax would be due at decedent's death 
(assuming her estate was large enough to be subject to estate taxation), but no tax would 
be due at the child's death (because the child had no estate). For more discussion of the 
mechanics, see DOBRIS, STERK & LESLIE, supra note 7. 
'•i 26 U.S.C. § 2631(a) (2002). Note that the exemption is indexed for inflation, 26 
U.S.C. § 2631(b), with the exemption for 2003 being $1,120,000. 
12 See, e.g., James J. Costello Jr. & Anthony M. Vizzoni, Creating Dynasty Trusts: How 
New Jersey's Modified Rule Against Perpetuities Generates Powerful Estate Planning 
Techniques, N.J.L.J., May 29, 2000, at S-2; King, supra note 2. For a discussion of the 
impact of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, see Stephen 
E. Greer, The Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 253 (2001). 
1^ The Rule Against Perpetuities does not directly limit trust duration; even in states 
where the Rule remains in effect, a settlor can create a trust that might endure for longer 
than the Rule's period. For an example, see Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities Literacy for the 
21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219, 221 (1989). Lynn demonstrates that if a trust 
beneficiary's interest "vests" within the period of the Rule, that beneficiary's interest may 
continue to be held in trust for that beneficiary's lifetime, even if the beneficiary's lifetime 
exceeds lives in being at the trust's creation plus twenty-one years. But the Rule does 
effectively limit trust duration, because the interest of each trust beneficiary—whether a 
beneficiary of income or of principal—must vest within the period of the Rule. 
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with the lawyer who had botched the will.^^ And because the 
estate itself had not been diminished in size by the drafting error, 
the executor could not recover as a representative of the now-
deceased testator. As a result, the failure of a lawyer to 
understand the Rule Against Perpetuities bore no significant risk 
of liability for error, despite the slaughter of some of Barton 
Leach's "innocents." As state after state abolished or liberalized 
the privity rule in the estate context,^"* the Rule's complexity—and 
the potential for error—loomed as a potential source of lawyer 
liability. Lawyer self-interest joined tax avoidance as a reason to 
abolish the Rule.^' 
II. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE TO ABOLISH THE RULE 
Two states, Idaho and Wisconsin, have long held that the 
Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to interests held in 
trust.^° In 1983, however, the South Dakota Legislature started a 
new wave of competition by abolishing the common law Rule 
entirely. Although the legislature maintained restrictions on 
suspension of the power of alienation of propertythe legislature 
explicitly provided that "there is no suspension of the power of 
alienation by a trust... if the trustee has power to sell, either 
express or implied... Unlike the legislation in Wisconsin and 
Idaho, however, the South Dakota legislation was part of an 
aggressive campaign to attract trust and banking positions to the 
" See, e.g., Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996) (discussing, and adhering to, 
the common law rule). 
See Martin D. Begleiter, First Let's Sue All The Lawyers—What Will We Get: 
Damages for Estate Planning Malpractice, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 327 (2000) (noting that 
as of 1999, only six states retained a rule of absolute privity prohibiting will beneficiaries 
from bringing action against drafting attorneys). 
See Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 153 (arguing that malpractice liability would 
stimulate lawyers to reform rules that impose needless costs). 
Professor Joel Dobris suggests yet another reason for the Rule's demise: a different 
social attitude toward the rich, and toward perpetual entities. See Joel C. Dobris, The 
Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000). 
20 The Idaho statute provides expressly that "there shall be no rule against perpetuities 
applicable to real or personal property"; the statute prohibits only suspension of the power 
of alienation for a period longer than lives in being plus twenty-five years, and only in the 
case of real property. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (2002). 
The Wisconsin statute, like the Idaho statute, expressly abolishes the common law 
Rule Against Perpetuities, substitutes a restriction on suspension of the power of 
alienation, and provides that so long as the trustee has the power to sell the trust property, 
the power of alienation has not been suspended. WIS. STAT. § 700.16.(2001) 
21 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-1 (1997). 
22 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-4 (1997). 
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State. Just a few years earlier, South Dakota had repealed its 
interest rate ceiling on consumer credit cards,^ luring Citibank's 
credit card business to the state.^" South Dakota has cemented its 
reputation as a trust-friendly jurisdiction by rejecting a state 
income tax.^ And it has been reported that South Dakota 
continues to seek other avenues to expand its trust business.^® 
Following South Dakota's lead, Delaware and Alaska 
substantially watered down their own versions of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. In both states, the effort was combined with 
legislation authorizing asset protection trusts in an explicit effort to 
attract trust business from other states. In 1995, Delaware enacted 
legislation to exempt trusts of personal property from all 
perpetuities restrictions." If a Delaware trust includes real 
property, the Delaware statute requires distribution of the real 
property within 110 years from the later of the time the property is 
purchased by the trust or the trust becomes irrevocable.^ In 1997, 
the Alaska legislature amended its perpetuities statute—then 
derived from the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
(USRAP)—to provide that a non-vested property interest is valid, 
even if it contains interests which will not vest within the Rule's 
period, so long as "all or part of the income or principal of the 
trust may be distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a 
person who is living when the trust is created."" Although this 
statute was designed to permit dynasty trusts, the language itself 
was problematic, leading the Alaska legislature to further enact 
amendments clarifying the State's abolition of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities as a limit on trust duration.^ 
23 SL 1979, ch. 335, § 2 (repealing S.D. Codified Laws § 54-11-6). South Dakota 
repealed the usury ceiling in response to the Marquette Bank case, which made it clear 
that a national bank may charge interest rates applicable in the state where the bank is 
located, regardless of a usury ceiling in effect in the depositor's state of domicile. See 
Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
2" See generally Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate 
Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201,215-16 (1986). 
23 See Pierce H. McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for Generations 
to Come, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Oct. 1993, at 47 (noting that South Dakota voters defeated 
a proposal for an income tax in a 1992 referendum). 
2® See Pierce H. McDowell, III, Trust Forum Shopping: The Next Generation, TRUSTS 
& ESTATES, Aug. 1997, at 10 (noting that South Dakota's governor was pushing a task 
force to expand legislative prowess in enacting trust legislation). 
22 70 DEL. LAWS, C. 164, effective July 7,1995, and codified in 25 DEL. CODE § 503(a) 
28 25 DEL. CODE § 503(b) (2002). 
2» ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3), added by SLA 1997, ch. 6, § 6. 
3° Id. § 34.27.051, entitled "Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities," applies only with 
respect to powers of appointment, and is designed only to save potential trust settlors from 
the pitfalls of the "Delaware Tax Trap." See Greer, supra note 15, at 278-82. ALASKA 
STAT. § 34.27.075 provides explicitly that the "common law rule against perpetuities does 
not apply in this state." ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2002). 
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The race to permit perpetual trusts has not stopped there. 
Other states—perhaps acting in part to stem the flow of trust funds 
to South Dakota, Delaware and Alaska—have also abolished the 
Rule. In less than six years, at least fourteen states and the District 
of Columbia have abolished a rule that has been in place for four 
centuries.^^ 
Why compete for trust business? Trust business is good for a 
state's economy. If banks and trust companies expand within the 
state, or if new banks or trust companies set up shop, the state 
benefits from more jobs, and consequently more disposable 
income to stimulate the rest of the state's economy.^^ 
Moreover, if a state were to abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities in order to attract trust business, out-of-staters could 
not easily take advantage of the new legal regime without actually 
using the facilities of the state's banks or trust companies. It is 
true, of course, that the statutes abolishing the Rule Against 
Perpetuities do not expressly limit abolition to trusts created with 
a local trustee.^^ But if an out-of-state settlor creates a trust using a 
trust company in her home state as trustee, that state's courts are 
not likely to apply Alaska law to validate a provision that violates 
the home state's Rule Against Perpetuities, even if the trust 
agreement expressly chooses Alaska law.^'' Moreover, many trust 
settlors seeking to create perpetual trusts will also want to obtain 
the benefits of the asset protection rules of states like Alaska or 
Delaware, and the Alaska and Delaware statutes make those rules 
3' See WYO. STAT. 34-l-139(B)(I) (enacted in 2003); R.R.S. NEB. 76-2005(a) (enacted 
in 2002); REV. CODE WASH 11.98.140 (enacted in 2001); B.C. CODE 19-904(10) (enacted 
in 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. 15-11-F (2002) (enacted in 2001); REV. STAT. MO. 456.236 
(2002) (enacted in 2001); VA. CODE § 55-13.3(C) (2002) (enacted in 2000); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 33-13-11 (2002) (enacted in 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. 689.225(2)(f) (extending 
period to 360 years; enacted in 2000); N.J. STAT § 46:2F-9 (2002) (enacted in 1999); ME. 
REV. STAT. 33-LOLA (2002) (enacted in 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2131.09(B)(2002) 
(enacted in 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2901(A) (2002) (enacted in 1998); ILL. L. C. 
STAT. 765.305/3 (2002) (enacted in 1998); MD. ESTATES & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-102 
(2002) (enacted in 1998). 
These statutes vary considerably in operation, from outright abolition of the Rule, to 
exemption for all trusts, to exemption for trusts that include a provision opting out of the 
Rule. See generally 35-1 U. MIAMI L. CENTER EST. PLAN. 125 (2001). 
32 In this respect, trust business is different from the corporate charter business states 
seek to attract, from which state coffers can derive significant revenue. Indeed, Delaware 
draws a significant percentage of state revenue from corporate charters. ROMANO, supra 
note 5, at 6. With trusts, by contrast, states appear most concerned about drawing 
business to local financial institutions and lawyers. 
33 Indeed, some statutes expressly provide that out-of-state trusts become subject to 
local law if the trusts declare an intention to be governed by local law. See, e.g., OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2131.09(B)(2) (2002). 
3^ As I have observed elsewhere, "courts have virtually never applied the law of the 
trust's situs or the law expressly chosen by the settlor when the settlor chose situs or the 
law to evade a strong public policy of the settlor's domicile." Sterk, supra note 5, at 1086. 
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aoolicable only to trusts in which the trustee has a significant 
relationship to the state.- Thus, if the seUlor wants to avah herself 
of all of the advantages of Alaska or Delaware law, the settlor 
miict use Alaska or Delaware institutions. 
Sr would prefer to transfer assets to Delaware. The principal 
constraint on the flow of money to Delaware or Alaska is lie ̂  
be the reluctance of local lawyers and banks to advise settlors 
about out-of-state alternatives—alternatives that may siphon o 
their own business. Yet fiduciary duty—particularly of lawyers 
may ultimately require them to advise clients about the advantage 
^^Fâ ed botĥ with internal pressure to abolish the Rule, and 
with the prospect that Delaware and Alaska would attract trust 
dollars from local banks and trust companies, other states quickly 
bir.o"d by abolishing or significantly .'Urtathng 'hen 
S Asainst Perpetuities. Because capital is so mobile, other 
states had little to gain by clinging to existing law; money would 
simply flow outward, so that the Rule would apply to less and 
property. Statutory Rule Against 
fUSRAP)—designed as a reform of the common law Rule rather 
han an abolition of perpetuities "^e^trictions-con^^^^ 
measure to the movement toward abolition." USRAP araiieu 
by some of the nation's leading property 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Mate 
Laws-* the validity of a non-vested *y ̂  
wheneve? the interest (1) satisfied the 
nrprallv vests or terminates within ninety years of its creation. y 
fxXX pSmMng any trust to endure for at least muety years 
the drafters of USRAP signaled that ninety-year trusts would do 
no significant harm to the sodal fabric. And if nmety yeajs^is 
unobjectionable, why not IJU, 
~~ s n OA n-TSlrl 120021- DEL CODE ANN., tit. 12, § 3570(8) (2002). 
SuU Ruir Agains, Pe.pa.aUie. ha. ten into .h. 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901- 2-906 (1^ 
38 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a) (1990). 
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jurisdictions enacted USRAP before, in short order, exempting 
qualified trusts from the Rule altogether.^' 
III. COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY, AND EXTERNALITIES 
An extensive literature suggests that competition among 
states tends to generate efficient legal rules.'*" The basic notion is 
that if a state develops inefficient rules, other states will exploit the 
inefficiency by offering more efficient rules that will draw 
businesses and residents away from the state with the inefficient 
regime. States with inefficient rules will respond in turn, leading to 
a "race to the top." 
Embedded in the "race to the top" hypothesis, however, are 
several key assumptions. Among the most important are, first, 
that legislators act as rational maximizers of state interests;"* 
second, that firms and individuals have the ability to move from 
state to state without significant cost;"^ and finally, that state 
regulation generates no significant externalities."^ If these 
assumptions do not hold, competition does not guarantee efficient 
regulation. Of course, even if these assumptions prove untrue, it 
might be that the legal regime generated by competition turns out 
to be the most efficient regime; the problem is that the existence of 
competition will not, by itself, sort efficient legal regimes from 
inefficient ones. 
In this light, consider the Rule Against Perpetuities as a 
3' See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2901(A)(3) (2002) (adding a provision to USRAP 
making nonvested interests valid whenever the interests are in trust with a trustee who has 
power to sell trust assets, and at some time, one or more persons living when the trust is 
created have an unlimited power to terminate). 
The literature builds on Charles Tiebout's 1956 article arguing that competition 
among municipalities could generate efficient provision of public goods because potential 
residents could choose the municipality that provided their preferred mix of public goods; 
leading municipalities, in turn, to adapt their mix of public goods to attract new residents 
until the cost of adding residents exceeded the benefit. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20 (1956). 
The legal literature has adapted Tiebout's argument to evaluate claims that 
competition among states, rather than municipalities, might generate efficient legal rules. 
The pioneering work was Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). The legal literature has 
mushroomed over the past quarter century. For some of the leading works, see supra note 
5. 
For more extensive discussion of this assumption, see Julian Margolis, Public 
Policies for Private Profits: Urban Government, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC 
CHOICE 289 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974); Bratton & 
McCahery, supra note 5, at 237-38; Sterk, supra note 5, at 1056-61. 
Tiebout, supra note 40, at 419. 
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 5, at 231-33; Revesz, supra note 5, at 1222. 
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regulation of trust duration. Scholars and courts have identified a 
number of justifications for the Rule (or something like it). The 
Rule promotes alienability of land.'^ The Rule promotes 
intergenerational equity.''^ The Rule encourages entrepreneurial 
activity by limiting the period during which trust assets are subject 
to the conservative investment strategies historically pursued by 
trustees."® The Rule reduces agency costs by limiting the time 
period during which beneficial ownership and control can be 
separated."^ The Rule limits the duration of spendthrift 
restrictions, which can themselves encourage inefficient behavior."* 
The next section examines the strength of these justifications. 
For present purposes, the important point is that the evils that 
underlie these justifications are evils whose primary impact will be 
felt in the state in which the trust beneficiaries live, not the state in 
which the trust, as a matter of form, is created. Consider, for 
instance, the supposed inefficiencies associated with spendthrift 
trusts. If a beneficiary knows his creditors—tort or contract—will 
not be able to reach his beneficial interest in trust, the beneficiary 
may take inadequate care to avoid doing harm to others because 
he will not ultimately bear the cost of that harm."' That is, the 
spendthrift trust beneficiary who imposes loss on his creditor will 
not have to reduce his own expenditures or work to earn 
additional income to make the creditor whole. Although the 
beneficiary's careless actions might on occasion cause harm to out-
of-staters, the effect of the beneficiary's actions will, in general, 
have the greatest effect in the area where the beneficiary is most 
likely to interact with others—in or near his home state. 
In particular, if a New Yorker creates a perpetual spendthrift 
trust for the benefit of her descendants, the likelihood is small that 
any actions taken by the beneficiary-descendants will have a 
significant effect on Alaska creditors. Over time, it is likely that 
See Dukeminier, supra note 9, at 1043-44; 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.4 
(1952). 
See Verner F. Chaffin, Georgia's Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too 
Much Control, 35 GA. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2000); ROBERT J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 10 (1966); LEWIS SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD 
HAND 56-60 (1955). 
See Chaffin, supra note 45, at 23-24. 
Cf. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 
68 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1992). 
^ See SiMES, supra note 45, at 56-60. 
Indeed, spendthrift trusts insulate beneficiaries even from the consequences of their 
intentional torts. Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d. 410 (N.H. 2001) provides a recent and 
egregious example. A spendthrift trust beneficiary sexually assaulted a child, videotaped 
the assault, and broadcast the tape over the internet. The child recovered a judgment for 
more than $500,000, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the child could not 
reach the trust income or principal to satisfy the judgment. 
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some of the beneficiaries will leave New York, but the chances 
that those beneficiaries will move to Alaska, or have significant 
dealings with Alaska creditors, is relatively small. As a result, if 
Alaska authorizes perpetual spendthrift trusts, Alaska does so with 
the knowledge that many of the costs such trusts engender will be 
felt outside Alaska. At the same time, if Alaska authorizes the 
creation of perpetual spendthrift trusts, Alaska will reap the full 
benefit of any trust business that migrates to Alaska because of its 
debtor-friendly legal environment. 
This, in turn, creates pressure on larger states—New York 
included—to revise its legal system to avoid the exodus of trust 
business. The ultimate result is that even if it would be inefficient 
for each state to authorize perpetual trusts, both states would 
authorize such trusts. The decision to enforce perpetual trusts, in 
game theory terms, represents a Nash equilibrium,^" represented 
by the following illustration: 
New York 
Enforce Don't Enforce 
Enforce (-2, -8) (4, -14) 
Alaska 
Don't (-3, -7) (0,0) 
Enforce 
Assume as a baseline a regime in which neither state enforces 
perpetual trusts—a regime in which the common law 
perpetuities—or some near equivalent—operates to restrict trust 
duration. Assume further that if both states enforced perpetual 
trusts, each state would incur a significant cost, representing the 
inefficiencies associated with perpetual trusts. Assume that the 
cost would be two for Alaska and eight for New York, reflecting 
the greater potential for inflicting loss on creditors in a larger state. 
Assume further that if Alaska authorizes perpetual trusts but New 
York does not. New York will lose, and Alaska will gain, trust 
business with a value of six. If New York authorizes perpetual 
trusts, but Alaska does not, assume that Alaska will lose, and New 
York will gain, trust business with a value of one (reflecting the 
smaller pool of capital owned by Alaska residents). 
For discussion of Nash equilibria, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND 
INFORMATION 32-35 (1989). 
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On these assumptions, Alaska would be better off abandoning 
its baseline regime and authorizing perpetual trusts. If New York 
chooses not to enforce perpetual trusts, Alaska is better off 
enforcing those trusts: the payoff to Alaska increases from 0 to 4. 
Similarly, if New York chooses to enforce perpetual trusts, Alaska 
is also better off enforcing those trusts: its payoff increases from -3 
to -2. Thus, whatever position New York takes, Alaska is better 
off enforcing perpetual trusts; for Alaska, enforcing these trusts is 
a weakly dominant strategy.'' 
But once Alaska enforces perpetual trusts. New York is also 
better off enforcing perpetual trusts: the payoff to New York 
increases from 
-14 to -8. And once both states enforce perpetual trusts, neither 
would be better off by unilaterally changing its rule to refuse 
enforcement to these trusts. As a result, the situation in which 
both states enforce—the set (enforce; enforce)—is a Nash 
equilibrium. By contrast, although the set (do not enforce; do not 
enforce) generates higher payoffs to both states, it is not an 
equilibrium set because Alaska has an incentive to change its rule 
to enforcement of perpetual trusts. 
What this analysis demonstrates, then, is that competition 
among states cannot be relied upon to insure efficient regulation 
of trust duration. Because each state's regulation of domestic 
trusts creates external effects in other states, competition can, in 
fact, lead to inefficient regulation. 
IV. Is THERE ANY INEFFICIENCY? : RE-EXAMINING THE 
RATIONALES FOR THE RULE 
Because competition is an unreliable guarantor of efficiency, 
the question remains: does the Rule Against Perpetuities, or some 
comparable regulation of trust duration, protect against 
inefficiency? That the Rule once operated to limit inefficiency is 
clear. Leach and Tudor observed, half a century ago, that after 
seventeenth century English courts had enabled landowners to 
create indestructible executory interests, "some new rule seemed 
to be required to prevent the creation of an infinite series of 
contingent future interests which would effectively withdraw from 
commerce more and more land.'"^ The question, however, is 
A dominant strategy is "a player's strictly best response to any strategies the other 
players might pick." Id. at 28. 
52 w. BARTON LEACH & OWEN TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 15 (2d 
ed. 1957). 
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whether the once-powerful efficiency justifications for the Rule 
survive into the twenty-first century. 
A. Enhancing Marketability of Property 
The Rule Against Perpetuities has often been justified as one 
in a collection of common law rules designed to make land more 
marketable." If a landowner were entitled to create a series of 
contingent future interests that would endure perpetually, the 
presence of those future interests—owned by persons not yet 
born—could make it impossible for a person who values the land 
to acquire a fee interest in that land. However important this 
justification might be with respect to legal interests in land, the 
justification does not apply to equitable interests held in trust.^'' So 
long as the trustee has power to sell whatever land is held in trust 
(or whatever other assets the trust holds), concerns about 
marketability disappear. 
B. Curtailing "Dead Hand" Control 
Perpetuities scholars have often argued that limiting dead 
hand control of property serves as a coequal—or even primary— 
justification for the Rule." As one scholar has put it, the Rule 
helps to "strike a balance between the wishes of the dead and the 
desires of the living with respect to the use of wealth."" But why 
strike such a balance? Why should the law limit a property 
owner's ability to control disposition of the property after his 
Gray, for instance, believed that "the system of rules disallowing restraints on 
alienation and the Rule against Perpetuities are the two modes adopted by the Common 
Law for forwarding the circulation of property which it is its policy to promote." JOHN 
CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2.1 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 
1942). Other common law rules promoting marketability include the rule making 
contingent remainders destructible and the prohibition on direct restraints on alienation. 
See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.4,26.1 (1952). 
5" See Dobris, supra note 19, at 635-36; Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in 
Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 352 (1990); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 47, at 
20. The American Law of Property notes that the Rule was extended from legal to 
equitable interests "without discussion or recognition" of the differences between the 
interests. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 16 (1952). 
'5 See J. H. C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
13-18 (2d ed. 1986); LYNN, supra note 45, at 10 n.21 (1966). 
LYNN, supra note 45, at 10. See also LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 111? (2d ed. 1956) (arguing that the Rule "strikes a fair 
balance between the satisfaction of the wishes of the members of the present generation to 
tie up their property and those of future generations to do the same"). 
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One answer rests on notions of intergenerational equity. 
Land is finite in quantity. If members of the present generation, in 
unison, were to create future interests that restricted the use and 
succession of land for 300 years, members of the next generation, 
or the generation to follow, would not enjoy comparable freedom: 
there would be no more land to restrict. And the argument was 
particularly powerful in an era during which land—far more than 
capital or labor—represented money and power. The Rule 
Against Perpetuities, by limiting the duration of dead-hand 
control, preserves for each generation a roughly comparable 
power to control the use and succession of land. 
This argument, however, does not apply to equitable interests 
held in trust. So long as legal title to property, real and personal, is 
held in trust, that property is available for acquisition by members 
of each generation—so long as they create new wealth by dint of 
their own labor or capital in some combination. Members of each 
generation have equal power to generate wealth and to restrict its 
disposition. The Rule is not necessary to assure intergenerational 
equity.^' 
57 Richard Epstein has articulated the general argument against restricting dead hand 
The grantor owns the property outright and could have consumed it 
completely When the grant is made subject to condition, the grantee can 
either refuse to accept the limitation, or take it for what it is.... If the grantee 
does not like the restrictions, there is an easy ouh he can reject the gift and 
acquire his own property by purchase and thus obtain absolute control over it. 
Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future, The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 704-05 (1986). 
58 See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 56, § 1117. 
59 Of course within any individual wealthy family, the Rule may operate to limit the 
power of one generation to influence decisions by a subsequent generation. But so long as 
we are committed to the notion of freedom of disposition by the person who owns the 
property, it is not clear why the property owner should not be able to impose conditions o 
her own choosing on the objects of her bounty. As Epstein emphasizes 
owner is entitled to consume the property, so the object of her bounty has lost nothing 
the property owner instead disposes of the property subject to a variety of conditions. 
Epstein, supra note 57, at 705. ,, 
On the other hand, as a practical matter, no sensible person of means would 
consume all of her property before death simply because we do not know for sure when 
we will die. Indeed, leading economists once theorized that most saving is exp amed by the 
desire of individuals to insure a smooth consumption path during their lifetimes to 
protect against inadequate income, particularly m old age. See Franco Modigliam & 
Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Furiction: An Interpretation of 
Cross-Section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 
1954). If most people conserve resources rather than consuming them in order to assure 
adequate provision for their own futures, the hypothetical property owner with a lega 
entitlement to consume all of her resources may provide a weak foundation for Epstein s 
conclusion. And, indeed. Professor Melanie Leslie has argued first, that American courts 
permit less freedom of testation in practice than statutes appear to authorize, see Melame 
2003] R.I.P. FOR THE R.A.P. 2111 
A second justification for limiting dead-hand control focuses 
on the costs imposed by long-term trusts: in particular, the agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership from control and 
the inefficiencies associated with spendthrift restrictions. But the 
efficiency case for curtailing dead hand control must account for a 
very basic argument: the property owner is in the best position to 
make efficient decisions about its disposition, and if the property 
owner chooses to create a trust, she does so because the benefits of 
the trust form more than offset any attendant costs.^ Because the 
trust settlor has an interest in maximizing the value her 
beneficiaries derive from her property dispositions, efficiency 
concerns justify interfering with a settlor's control only when her 
dispositions have the potential to create negative externalities. 
Against that background, the next two sections consider the costs 
associated with long-term trusts. 
1. Agency Costs and Tax Benefits 
A trust, by definition, requires the separation of legal from 
beneficial ownership," or in terms familiar from other contexts, 
the separation of ownership from control." Separation of 
ownership from control inevitably generates agency costs. First, if 
we assume that each individual is best able to evaluate his or her 
interests," the trustee cannot evaluate the beneficiary's interests as 
well as the beneficiary can, leading to potential inefficiency. 
Second, even if the trustee fully understands the beneficiary's 
interests, the trustee may face incentives that induce him to 
B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996), and second, 
that assuring dutiful family members an appropriate inheritance often reflects an implicit 
agreement by the parties, see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, 
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 11 N.C. L. REV. 551 (1999). Taking Professor 
Leslie's argument one step further, one could argue that permitting a property owner to 
impose onerous conditions on inheritance would be inconsistent with the understanding of 
the members of the family unit. 
See Epstein, supra note 57, at 705 ("The present owner can so tailor the terms of his 
grant to mediate in advance the potential conflicts amongst the subsequent grantees. His 
common grantees are in functional privity with each other because they are in actual 
privity with the grantor."). 
" See, e.g.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). 
In the corporate literature, discussion of problems associated with separation of 
ownership and control originated with ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 (rev. ed. 1967). 
" The assumption is basic to utilitarian theories of autonomy and economic theories of 
consumer sovereignty. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69,141-43 (Himmelfarb 
ed. 1985) (1859); see generally Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: 
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,15-16 (1995). 
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sacrifice his personal interests to those of the beneficiary. In 
particular, the trustee has an interest in maintaining property in 
trust, even if the trust is unnecessary to serve the interests of the 
beneficiary, because the trustee's commissions will disappear when 
the trust terminates.®' In addition, potential liability for imprudent 
investments might lead a trustee to invest conservatively even 
when a more aggressive investment strategy would better suit the 
beneficiary's interest.®® 
Why would a trust settlor impose these agency costs on her 
beneficiaries?®^ One answer lies in the flexibility the family trust 
permits. By creating a trust, the settlor can tailor dispositions in 
ways that account for future circumstances of her beneficiaries. 
Suppose, for instance, settlor wants to divide her property among 
her children, but also wants to assure that her husband (perhaps by 
a second marriage) receives adequate provision during his lifetime. 
Settlor can achieve that objective by directing that the trustee pay 
income to the husband during his lifetime, or by conferring on the 
trustee discretion to make payments to the husband, out of 
income, out of principal or both. 
If trusts offered no benefits other than increased flexibility, 
the efficiency case for regulating trust duration would be 
exceedingly weak. Before creating a trust, settlor (with the help of 
" 5eeHirsch& Wang, supra note 47, at 29. 
« Debris, supra note 19, at 629 n.ll9 ("There is the risk, not much noticed in current 
discussions (but real nonetheless), that a distant trustee may become a tyrant and may be 
unwilling to reduce or terminate a trust when it means the loss of trustee fee income. ). 
^ Professor Joel Dobris has observed, however, that trust investment reforms of the 
1990s particularly the Uniform Prudent Investor Act—reduces the incentive for the 
trustee to invest conservatively by importing modern portfolio theory into the trustee s 
investment obligations, /d. at 637. t .4 .i 
Of course, agency costs like these are not unique to the trust relationship. Indeed, 
by private agreement, property owners often relinquish control of property when they see 
benefits that offset the agency costs generated by the separation of ownership and control. 
The purchase of shares in a publicly-held corporation furnishes the most obvious example. 
The modern corporation aggregates capital in a way that enables shareholders to obtain 
returns that might not otherwise be available, and provides professional management that 
frees the shareholder from day-to-day business decisions. Because of these evident 
advantages, corporate scholarship focuses not on reuniting ownership and control, but on 
decreasing agency costs in an environment that will continue to separate agency and 
control. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Victor 
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1403 (1985). ^ „. . 
The ordinary family trust, however, does not generate the sanie etficiency 
advantages as the corporation. If their interests were not held in trust, beneficiaries could 
choose on their own whether to contract for professional management. However, the 
trust denies beneficiaries the power to make their own investment decisions. Moreover, m 
light of the forms of organization specifically designed for the aggregation of capital and 
the conduct of business—e.g., the corporation, the limited partnership, and the LLC—it is 
difficult to justify the family trust as a mechanism for aggregating capital. 
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legal and financial advisors) would compare the agency costs with 
the benefits associated with increased flexibility. Both the costs 
and the benefits would be felt by settlor's beneficiaries, not by 
third parties. As a result, settlor would have little reason to create 
the trust unless the trust's benefits exceeded their costs. 
Trusts, however, offer benefits other than increased flexibility. 
In particular, under current law a settlor can significantly reduce 
(or postpone) future estate tax liability through appropriate use of 
trusts. For instance, settlors seeking to maximize the value of the 
$1,120,000 exemption from the generation-skipping transfer tax 
can do so most easily by creating a trust that will last for as long as 
possible.® 69 
Tax avoidance by property owners is not by itself inefficient. 
But introducing tax avoidance as a motivation for trust creation 
undermines the argument that a settlor would create a trust only 
when the trust's benefit exceeds its costs. The settlor has no 
incentive to consider the costs imposed on other taxpayers when 
the settlor avoids estate taxation. As a result, even when agency 
costs are high, settlor might create a trust to effect a transfer from 
the government (and presumably, other taxpayers) to the settlor 
and her beneficiaries—even though the transfer generates no 
social gain to offset the high agency costs.™ 
Against this background, limits on trust duration rernam a 
safeguard against inefficiency. Short-term trusts create limited 
potential for inefficiency. With respect to persons alive at a 
property owner's death—her living grandchildren, for instance 
the property owner can obtain the benefit of the generation-
skipping transfer tax exemption without using a trust at all. The 
property owner can simply make an outright gift to the 
grandchildren and, within the limit of the exemption, the property 
owner will avoid a full generation of estate taxation; no tax will be 
5EE Greer, SUPRA note 15, at 255-57. „ J 
® For example, suppose a particular tax were inefficient. If taxpayers could all avoid 
the tax without cost, causing the government to raise money through a more efficient tax, 
tax avoidance might even generate efficiency gains. For a discussion of the relative 
efficiency of tax systems, see David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency 
IN FLIE TAX LAW, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
When tax avoidance entails cost (either out-of-pocket, like lawyer s fees, or 
substitution of a less preferred good for a more preferred good, like property held in trust 
for property held absolutely), the cost generated by avoidance is a deadweight loss. As 
Professor Weisbach puts it, "[d]eadweight loss results from the loss of consuiner (and 
producer) surplus when comparing the after-tax world to the before-tax world. Id. at 
™ One way to erase this potential inefficiency would be to remove the potential for tax 
avoidance, either by abolishing the estate tax or by eliminating the tax benefits associated 
with trusts. And, indeed, the pressure to permit dynasty trusts would undoubtedly abate it 
Congress permanently abolished the estate tax. 
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due at the death of property owner's children. If the property 
owner creates a trust instead of making an outright gift, she does 
so not to avoid taxation, but because she has decided that the 
greater flexibility of the trust form produces benefits that outweigh 
the agency costs associated with the trust. 
It is only when a property owner seeks to avoid estate 
taxation for multiple generations that the trust becomes essential 
to her scheme; a property owner cannot make an outright gift to 
an unborn, unascertained descendant. At the same time, it is with 
multiple generation trusts that the supposed efficiency gains of the 
trust form become more speculative. The property owner has no 
special knowledge about the propensities of his great­
grandchildren, and there is little reason to think that his 
prospective judgment, made two generations earlier, will better 
approximate the interests of the great-grandchildren than will the 
judgment of the great-grandchildren themselves." Of course, the 
trust settlor could compensate for his lack of personal knowledge 
by conferring powers of appointment on some of his descendants, 
but the value of that device, too, becomes more speculative when 
the settlor knows little about the judgment of the person on whom 
he has conferred the power. 
This analysis suggests, then, that the Rule Against 
Perpetuities—or a comparable limit on trust duration—can 
operate to limit agency costs to those situations where there is 
good reason to believe that the costs are matched by compensating 
benefits. Once settlor creates a trust for beneficiaries whose 
propensities she does not know—the very trusts that would 
generally fall afoul of the Rule—there is less reason to believe that 
the trust's agency costs are matched by those benefits." 
2. Special Problems Associated with "Spendthrift" Provisions 
Family trusts often include spendthrift provisions designed to 
insulate trust beneficiaries from creditor claims. These spendthrift 
provisions introduce agency costs; because the beneficial owner 
cannot bind the trustee to make future payments to an assignee 
rather than to the beneficiary personally, the beneficiary will not 
" As Robert Ellickson has put it, "the benefits of restrictions, measured year-by-year, 
decline as restrictions age. Costs, on the other hand, rise." Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse 
Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723,734-35 (1986). 
This conclusion tracks Lord Hobhouse's nineteenth century analysis, quoted supra 
note 7. 
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be able to serve his own interests as well as he would if he had 
more control of the trust property. 
Spendthrift trusts, however, introduce costs beyond agency 
costs. By limiting the trust beneficiary's financial accountability 
for his actions, the spendthrift trust creates incentives for the 
beneficiary to impose external costs. Assume that tort law is 
calibrated to induce actors to engage in the optimal level of care. 
That is, tort law threatens a potential tortfeasor in that if the 
tortfeasor engages in conduct he should have avoided, the 
tortfeasor will be required to compensate potential victims for 
their losses. If, however, the threat of compensation is an empty 
one (because the tortfeasor's assets are held in a spendthrift trust, 
and therefore beyond the reach of the tort victim), the potential 
tortfeasor has less reason to take care and more reason to engage 
in activity that creates a risk of harm in others." 
The beneficiary's incentive to impose external costs extends 
beyond the tort context. Suppose the beneficiary has made a 
contract. Suppose further that the beneficiary is considering 
breach, which will impose costs on the promisee. Contract law 
generally enables the promisee to visit the costs of breach on the 
promisor, thus causing the promisor to internalize the cost of his 
own breach." But if the promisor is a spendthrift trust beneficiary 
guaranteed the right to enjoy income from the trust even if the 
promisor breaches his contract, the cost of the beneficiary's breach 
" See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 
35 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tr. J. 479 (2000) (noting that the moral hazard of risk-generating 
behavior is aggravated by spendthrift provisions); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the 
Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 618-22 (1989). 
The corporate literature includes extensive discussion of the impact of limited liability 
on the incentive of actors to reduce precautions. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 
1879,1882-83 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1584-85 (1991); S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INX'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45-46 (1986). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93-97 (1985) (conceding the 
incentive effect of limited liability, but contending that limited liability—in the corporate 
context—generates corresponding benefits). 
See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gin 85 
CAL. L. REV. 821,836 (1997): 
The expectation measure gives the parties to a bargain the appropriate 
incentives to perform rather than breach and to take appropriate precautions to 
ensure that they will be able to perform. Because the expectation measure 
places on the breaching party the loss of the other party's share of the contract's 
joint value, it sweeps that loss into each party's self-interested calculus in a 
decision whether to perform or to breach. Similarly, the expectation measure 
causes each party to internalize the cost of failure to take adequate precaution 
against breach, and therefore creates an incentive for efficient precaution. 
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will remain external to the beneficiary.^^ 
Nevertheless, spendthrift restrictions have historically been 
enforced as a reflection of the property rights of the trust settlor.'^ 
The efficiency argument for deference to the settlor is two-fold: 
first, if denied the right to dispose of her property as she sees fit, 
the settlor might work less hard to accumulate property;'' and 
second, because settlor has special knowledge of the needs and 
"spendthrift" proclivities of some of her family members, she may 
be in the best position to tailor financial restrictions to the 
particular needs of those family members. The first of these 
arguments is of questionable validity,'® the second, as we have 
seen, has force only when the settlor has some concrete knowledge 
about the trust beneficiaries." 
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities effectively 
prevents a trust settlor from creating a spendthrift trust that will 
last much beyond the lifetime of persons the settlor knows. In 
single-generation trusts permitted by the Rule, the rationale for 
enforcing spendthrift restrictions has some plausibility despite the 
" As David Carlson has noted, "[t]he greatest risk involved in lending is the moral 
hazard—the risk that the debtor will decline to pay interest on the principal lent.' David 
Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 817, 823 (1995). 
Professor Carlson goes on to note that the risk of debtor misbehavior is a private cost to 
creditors, and that creditors "will strive to avoid or reduce it." Id. Spendthrift trusts 
present a moral hazard problem because a judgment-proof trust beneficiary may breach 
with impunity. The fact that spendthrift trust beneficiaries cannot use their interest m the 
trust to induce potential creditors or contract partners to deal with them will prevent the 
completion of transactions of benefit to both the spendthrift and the potential contract 
partner (either because the creditor refuses to deal with the spendthrift altogether, or 
because the risk premium the creditor will charge makes the deal unattractive to the 
spendthrift). 
For a somewhat unusual argument that spendthrift trusts are not inefficient 
despite the moral hazard problems they create, see Hirsch, supra note 63, at 66-70. Hirsch 
argues in part that because debtors may lack the expertise to know how to avoid default, 
creditors may be better able to assess and avoid risk. Hirsch admits, however, that the 
case is at best ambiguous. W. at 70. nn n. 
The leading case remains Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 
(1882), in which the court wrote: "The founder of this trust was the absolute owner of his 
property. He had the entire right to dispose of it, either by an absolute gift to his brother, 
or by a gift with such restrictions or limitations, not repugnant to law, as he saw fit to 
impose." Id. 
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 47, at 8: 
Bracton's assumption—shared by modern social scientists was that persons 
derive satisfaction out of bequeathing property to others. To the extent that 
lawmakers deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective value 
of property will drop, for one of its potential uses will have disappeared. As a 
result, thwarted testators will choose to accumulate less property, and the total 
stock of wealth existing at any given time will shrink. 
™ Id. (noting that once other reasons for accumulating wealth are considered, the 
economic impact of free testation may be quite small). 
" See text accompanying supra notes 71-72. 
2003] R.I.P. FOR THE R.A.P. 2117 
externalities spendthrift trusts can generate. In a world where 
trusts can endure forever, however, the rationale for enforcing 
spendthrift limitations evaporates. No efficiency gains 
counterbalance the negative externalities created by spendthrift 
restrictions. The Rule, then, operates to limit the inefficiencies 
associated with spendthrift restrictions. 
V. LEGISLATIVE TIME HORIZONS: SHOULD LEGISLATURES 
CARE ABOUT THE INEFFICIENCIES OF PERPETUAL TRUSTS? 
The preceding sections demonstrate first, that competition 
among states tends to drive states toward abolition of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, and second, that the Rule continues to have 
a function. Without the Rule, or some substitute, settlors are 
likely to create trusts that generate agency costs and externalities 
without generating commensurate benefits. This section explains 
why—even apart from competitive pressures—these inefficiencies 
are unlikely to influence legislatures considering abolition of the 
Rule. 
First, consider the obvious public choice explanation: the 
beneficiaries of perpetual trusts are concentrated and politically 
powerful banks and trust companies.® By contrast, the parties 
most disadvantaged by perpetual trusts—beneficiaries frustrated 
in their ability to derive maximum advantage from trust 
monies/individual contract partners and tort creditors of 
spendthrift beneficiaries—are diffused throughout the population, 
with no organized political power. Hence, outside of the 
occasional law professor, the Rule Against Perpetuities will not 
have any significant champions. 
Abolition would have virtually no effect on trusts created 
before the date of abolition.®' The drafters of those trusts—most of 
them competent lawyers—would have drafted them to comply 
with the common law Rule. As a result, these trusts will expire by 
their terms, and the trust property will be distributed to the trust 
beneficiaries free of any trust restrictions. Abolition will not 
80 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 125-28 (1971) 
(noting that the most successful interest groups are likely to be those in which each 
member has large interests at stake). 
8^ A legislature considering abolition of the Rule has two basic choices. First, the 
legislature could abolish the Rule prospectively. Prospective abolition would have no 
effect on existing trusts. Second, the legislature could abolish the Rule retroactively. But 
most trusts created before the date of abolition already comply with the Rule (except for 
those drafted by incompetent lawyers). As a result, even retroactive abolition would have 
an effect only on an infinitesimally small number of trusts. 
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extend the duration of these trusts, and therefore will not create 
any new inefficiencies with respect to these trusts. 
Now consider the effect of abolition on trusts to be created in 
the future. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities permits 
settlors to create trusts that endure for a long time. A determined 
settlor can easily create a trust with an expected life span of fifty 
years,and in a jurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, a settlor can guarantee a trust 
life span of ninety years.®^ During that period, current law 
tolerates the agency costs and externalities chronicled in the 
preceding section. If a state legislature abolishes the Rule, the 
legislature may be authorizing new inefficiencies—but those 
inefficiencies will not be felt by anyone in the state for at least half 
a century! 
How, then, should a sensible and conscientious legislature act 
in the face of competitive pressures? First, there is no strong lobby 
in favor of retaining the Rule (at least with respect to interests 
held in trust). Second, even if the legislature believes that 
abolition of the Rule will create inefficiency in the distant future, 
circumstances could change so substantially over a fifty-year 
period to make today's tentative conclusions appear bizarre with 
the benefit of hindsight. Finally, even if today's assessment proves 
correct, and perpetual trusts do create future inefficiencies, future 
legislatures can deal with the problem in a variety of ways. For 
instance, legislatures (or courts) could alter rules affecting trust 
modification and termination to make it easier for trust 
beneficiaries to terminate trusts.^ In light of these factors, it 
would be quite natural for the legislature to abolish the Rule. And 
that, it appears, is what an increasing number will do. 
Professor Dukeminier reports that inquiries of estates lawyers at major New York 
and Los Angeles firms do not expect most trusts they draft to last for more than sixty 
years. Dukeminier, supra note 9, at 1045-46. 
83 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a)(2) (1990). 
8^ Indeed, Dukeminier has observed that England and the Canadian province of 
Manitoba have taken this approach, permitting beneficiaries to terminate a trust even 
when termination would contravene the settlor's intent. Dukeminier, supra note 9 at 
1058,1076-77. 
Under current American law, trust termination would generally entail significant 
estate tax disadvantages—in particular, once a trust beneficiary receives legal title to trust 
principal, the principal will pass through the beneficiary's estate. This increased taxation 
would defeat a material purpose of the settlor, which, under current American law, would 
generally prevent judicial termination of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 337(2) ("If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material 
purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination."). 
If estate taxation were abolished or significantly transformed, termination by the 
beneficiaries might no longer be inconsistent with the Restatement's position. 
